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Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Wars in
the Middle East. By Nader Uskowi. Lanham, MD; Rowman &
Littlefield, 2019. ISBN 978-1-5381-2173-3. Notes. Bibliography.
Maps. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xvii, 207. $42.00.
Temperature Rising examines the role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) as it expands it influence in both external and
internal roles. The book covers forty years of IRGC history and activities.
This tome is a must read for Iran watchers and those seeking a better
understanding of Iran’s role in the region. The author is the son of an
Iranian Imperial Army major general. He currently serves as a Senior
Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic
Council. He formerly served as a Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Central
Command.
During his foreign exile in Iraq and France, Ayatollah Khomeini
envisioned a “people’s army” to help overthrow Shah Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi. The Shah left Iran before Khomeini could establish such an entity.
Upon assuming power, Khomeini ordered the creation of the IRGC to
fulfill the “people’s army” function. Internally, the IRGC served as
guardians of the revolution to prevent U.S. or Shah-supported threat to
the regime from challenging Khomeini’s grip on power. Externally, the
IRGC was Khomeini’s force of shock troops to spread Islamic revolution
throughout the Middle East. Khomeini sought to establish Iran as the
regional power in not only the Persian Gulf, but the Middle East as well.
He saw the IRGC as his principal means of attaining that goal.
Uskowi outlines how the IRGC came into its own during the brutal eightyear Iran-Iraq war, proving its valor in battle and learning valuable lessons
in combat tactics and strategy. Khomeini came to rely on the IRGC more
than the regular Iranian army. The IRGC’s religious zeal cemented its role
in preserving Khomeini’s ideological vision of an Islamic republic. The war
served to solidify its ideological commitment to Khomeini’s brand of Shia
Islam as a bastion of true Islam against both Sunni Islam and nonMuslims.
During this same timeframe, the IRGC helped found, train, and
indoctrinate Lebanese Hizballah, Iran’s staunchest Shia ally. These years
shaped the IRGC into one of the most lethal terrorist groups in the world
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with a potent military capability. As the vanguards of the Islamic
revolution, the IRGC’s Quds Force (QF) became the lead tool to establish
and expand a Shia arc of influence to help Tehran gain footholds in fellow
Shia and weakened Sunni regimes in the region.
The author traces how the IRGC became the impetus behind a so-called
Shia Liberation Army (SLA) that has mobilized, trained, and armed almost
200,000 fighters in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. The
SLA, guided by the IRGC, serves as a mirror IRGC to safeguard and spread
Shia ideology and goals in the Middle East.
Uskowi takes the reader on a tour through the IRGC’s roles in the Arab
Spring, its fight against the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, IRGC
support for Houthis in Yemen, Iranian intrigues in western Afghanistan,
and Iran’s own internal political dynamic. Within Iran, the IRGC supports
the Office of the Supreme Leader. As such, it controls the country’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs. This span of control gives it more
autonomy than other governmental organs with less accountability.
Ideological zeal trumps bureaucratic competence.
The IRGC directs business enterprises through mega-foundations
controlling over five hundred business enterprises. These financial
structures make up roughly half of Iran’s economy and have enriched
senior IRGC officers through diversified business portfolios and selfaggrandizing deals. Some of the businesses are above board, while others
are “off the books.” This dynamic lends itself to more corruption and less
accountability.
The IRGC’s QF will continue to indoctrinate, train, and support Shia
movements and militias barring regime change in Tehran. Its specialized
units (armor, artillery, rockets, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial
vehicles, and special forces) deploy throughout the region to provide
intelligence, logistics, and training to irregular and regular forces to wage
conventional and hybrid warfare. With easy access to proxies and allies in
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, the IRGC can project
power well beyond Iran’s territory, in fulfillment of Khomeini’s vision of
regional influence.
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Thirty years after Khomeini’s death, his vision for the IRGC remains
intact. Iran seeks to be a regional power and sees itself as such. Employing
Khomeini’s militant interpretation of Shia Islam, the IRGC has served an
internal security organ, and an external expeditionary army.
Uskowi’s book has a rightful place on the shelf of anyone studying
terrorism, political violence, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Iran.
His keen insights and comprehensive examination of the IRGC skillfully
outline the organization’s impact on Iran and the region. This is one of the
best books on the topic since Kenneth Katzman’s The Warriors of Islam:
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
Mark Roberts
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